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THE PROBLEM OF THE FUTURE STATUS OF HYDERABAD

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SUMMARY

The current effort of the Nizam of Hyderabad to achieve international recognition threatens to involve his state in war with India. This development is a sequel to his rejection of the June 17 draft agreement negotiated with the Dominion of India providing for state affiliation and the introduction of a considerable measure of responsible government in Hyderabad. The Nizam's bid for independence is an effort to buttress the oligarchic powers of the Muslim minority over a population which is 85 percent non-Muslim. The Nizam recognizes that the state's central position in peninsular India makes it necessary to negotiate close political and economic relations with the Dominion Government but apparently hopes that foreign recognition of his claims will force Delhi to place these negotiations on an international basis.

Hyderabad contends that on the basis of the Parliamentary debates covering the Indian Independence Act of 1947 the states are under no compulsion to join one of the new Dominions but are free to assert their independence. The Dominion of India currently controls Hyderabad's defense, foreign affairs and communications under the so-called Standstill Agreement which will continue in effect until November, 1948. Although certain Muslim elements have attempted to influence the Nizam in favor of a settlement of the independence issue, a militant group of Muslims (the Razakars) are now in the ascendancy and are bringing pressure on the government to submit its claims for complete independence to the UN through one of the Arab nations, possibly Syria.

The Muslim ruling group bases Hyderabad's claim to independence on British statements which, though frequently

ambiguous, do mention the "independent" status of the states following termination of the British connection. When preparing to transfer power, the British recognized that the old system of integration would not be appropriate in an independent self-governing India and arranged for state representatives to join representatives of British India in forming a central government and negotiating individual matters of integration. The decision to transfer power in 1947, earlier than originally planned, precluded the possibility of completing by the time of transfer any negotiations for fresh terms of integration. Hyderabad authorities apparently considered the Standstill Agreement negotiated with India in November 1947 as an opportunity to muster the State's sizeable economic and military resources in a serious bid for independence; conflict with India was inevitable inasmuch as Delhi viewed it as an offer of a period of reorientation prior to Hyderabad's permanent affiliation.

India refuses to recognize Hyderabad's claims on the grounds that the past political and economic integration of the state with British India requires Hyderabad's permanent affiliation with one of the successor Dominions, and that popular political loyalties as well as geographic considerations require that this affiliation be with India. India is reluctant to use force, however, because of the difficulties involved in a military campaign against Hyderabad and the Razakar threats of Hindu massacres. Delhi at first employed economic pressure to force acceptance of the June 17 draft agreement, but the discovery of private British support for Hyderabad and clandestine aid from Pakistan has so incensed the more moderate Indian leaders that they now insist that Hyderabad must accept the same terms of affiliation as the other princely states, even though this means war. Any Hyderabad offer conceding the full substance of

of the draft agreement before the lapse of the present "standstill" agreement is unlikely as long as the Hyderabad authorities have grounds for hoping that they can gain international recognition for their claims.

Certain British Conservative Party members have urged London to recognize the Nizam's claims, apparently with a view to assuring greater scope for British security operations in the Indian Ocean area. The Labor Government, however, has attempted to persuade Hyderabad of the necessity for a peaceful settlement on the basis of India's demands. London believes that an independent Hyderabad could be a grave threat to Dominion security, especially when acting in close conjunction with Pakistan, and that recognition of such independence would set a dangerous precedent for the scores of other states in the Indian sphere which have only recently joined the Dominion. The British Government, therefore, probably will object to a reference of the controversy to the UN.

India will reject any reference of Hyderabad's claims to the UN as an invasion of the Dominion's prerogatives. If the India-Hyderabad dispute could be considered concurrently with the somewhat parallel disputes over Kashmir and Junagadh, however, it is possible that the way would be eased for a general settlement of the controversies over all three states. India might be more likely to recognize Pakistan's interests in Kashmir if this were accompanied by Pakistan's explicit recognition of the necessity for Hyderabad's affiliation with India. Pakistan might be prepared to offer concessions to the political opposition in Kashmir and protection to the Hindu minority, if these were coupled with an Indian offer of political concessions and protection for the Muslim minorities in Hyderabad and Junagadh. The immediate prospect for achieving a solution is not favorable, either in the UN or by direct negotiation. Growing belligerency on both sides indicates that time is running out.

INTRODUCTION[1]

The failure of the recent negotiations between the Dominion of India and the state of Hyderabad and the latter's current preparations to have its claims presented to the UN[2] are apparently preludes to an effort on the part of the Nizam's Government to achieve a large measure of independence. Indian Government spokesmen, however, have indicated that Hyderabad must agree to affiliate with India on some permanent basis, and that while the Dominion does not intend to use military force it may be compelled to do so if the Hyderabad authorities remain intransigent.

The present disagreement stems from the partition of India and the lapse of British paramountcy over the princely states on August 15, 1947. The Hyderabad Government takes the position that with the termination of the British connection the states automatically assumed full sovereign status. The state accordingly claims that Hyderabad may refuse to affiliate with either of the two new dominions and may rightfully seek international recognition. The Dominion of India has taken the contrary view that the lapse of the British system of paramountcy did not and could not cancel the actual political and economic integration of the states with the territory of the two Dominions. In opposition to the theory that the states maintained separate and direct relations with the British Crown, New Delhi has pointed out that in actual fact the Government of India wielded suzerain powers,

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1. Much of the background developments relating to the India-Hyderabad dispute has been treated in OIR 4586, 21 January 1948. It is accordingly suggested that the present comment be read in conjunction with the earlier report.

2. In addition, letters of appeal have been sent by the Nizam to King George VI, the Prime Minister of England, and the President of the United States.

exercising absolute control of defense and foreign affairs and determining through the Governor-General's Council all major policy matters on an All-India basis. The essential function of the "Political Department" of the Government of India (GOI) in its relations with the states was to assure the necessary compliance with GOI policy.[1] Under the Independence Act, the Indian argument runs, the Dominions of India and Pakistan became successors of the Government of India, and, accordingly, the only freedom left the states by the termination of the British connection was the freedom to negotiate fresh terms of affiliation with the appropriate Dominion.

I. Mutually Negotiated Affiliation to Replace Paramountcy

The present British Government expected that all the states would affiliate with one of the two Dominions. Under the Constitutional Plan of 1946 the British arranged for the states to join the rest of India in a Central Union Government with control over defense, foreign affairs, communications, and any other matters that might be ceded to the center by the princely states or the popularly governed provinces. It was expressly recognized, furthermore, that British suzerainty over the states could not be retained once British India achieved independence even if British-India were to remain within the Commonwealth. In view of the fact that the British system of paramountcy could not simply be transferred to the new government,[2] it was London's

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1. The Political Department, like all important posts of the Government of India, was staffed by Indian Civil Service officials (largely though not exclusively British) and its expenditures were included in the regular budget of the GOI.

2. Under the British system all important aspects of the political and economic integration of the states with British India were kept subject to the constant scrutiny and approval of top officials in the Government of India. Political parties in British India were not allowed to function directly in the states and the States' authorities were not allowed to maintain any contact with British India nor even to make any concessions to responsible government without prior official approval.

view that both the states and British India should be free to negotiate a fresh pattern of integration to fill the void created by the British withdrawal.

The British decision in 1947 to partition India and also to transfer power earlier than originally anticipated precluded the possibility of providing beforehand a fresh constitutional basis for cooperation between the states and the two new dominions. Instead, under the Indian Independence Act which went into effect on August 15, 1947, the British simply terminated their paramountcy over the states and turned over to the successor dominion governments the agencies through which Britain had previously exercised control. During the debate on the Act, Prime Minister Attlee pointed out that the states were expected to affiliate with one of the two Dominions, and that pending the drafting of the new constitutions and the working out of a comprehensive system, "There must necessarily be a less organic form of relationship" between the states and the Dominions. Furthermore, despite appeals from individual princes, including Hyderabad, London refused to recognize the international status of any of the states with the result that virtually all of them acceded to one of the two Dominions. The two most important exceptions were the large States of Kashmir and Hyderabad.

II. Ambiguity of British Statements

Despite this clear recognition of the necessity for some form of integration, British government spokesmen made statements which indicate confusion of thought over the exact legal position of the princely states following the passage of the Independence Act and prior to accession. (See Appendix B.) Sir Stafford Cripps, Prime Minister Attlee and Lord Mountbatten, each in somewhat varying terms, observed that with the termination of British paramountcy the states became "independent." In virtually

every case observations were made in contexts which left no doubt that the speakers felt that the States must link up with either India or Pakistan. The phrases could be interpreted to mean merely that the states' "independence" was in fact a necessary concomitant and part of the independence of the two Dominions.[1] These references to independence were nevertheless sufficiently ambiguous to encourage the hope in certain British and Indian quarters that if any of the states could hold out against affiliation for a long enough period they might eventually win international recognition.

In the spring and summer of 1947 a number of princes announced their intention of declaring their states independent. These claims gained considerable support when Jinnah, as spokesman for the future Dominion of Pakistan, announced his opinion that the states would achieve "full sovereign status" with the termination of the British connection.

III. The Problem of Partition

Some of the confusion in the British statements arises from attempting to describe in terms of modern concepts of international law the integration of feudally-governed states with self-governing provinces. The main practical difficulty, however, stems from the partition of the central government, which introduced communal differences and transformed the largely legalistic problem of states' accession into a hotly contested political issue between the Dominions.

The principal problem posed by the partition was whether the question of the integration of any particular state was to be

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1. Spokesmen for the princes implicitly recognized this fact when they avowed their "patriotism" and "loyalty to India" in 1946, and all of the major popular movements in the states have demanded affiliation with one or other of the Dominions.

decided primarily on a geographic and administrative basis or whether the communal and political loyalties of ruler and population were to be taken into account. London indicated clearly its belief that geographic necessity should constitute the principal consideration, and top British officials aided both Dominions in accomplishing the accession of states within their respective geographic spheres.[1] (Britain's withdrawal left the future status of the remaining unacceded states to be decided by negotiation between the dominions and the states in question.)

In Hyderabad's case, the Nizam's Government can advance no grounds geographically or administratively which require its affiliation with Pakistan; but it has refused to concede the principle of compulsory integration and has argued that the maintenance of communal harmony within Hyderabad territory demands that the state remain independent of both dominions. Hyderabad has undoubtedly been encouraged to advance this claim by Pakistan's refusal to join the Dominion of India in declaring publicly that all states must negotiate a permanent affiliation.[2] Within Pakistan's own sphere full accession has actually been required of all states.

The basic difference between the affiliation policies of the two Dominions is that whereas Jinnah decided in favor of

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1. With the exception of Kashmir the accession of the states is generally assumed to have been determined by geographic necessity. Yet it was undoubtedly religious and political ties that assigned the state of Tripura to India since the state's main outlets and economic ties are with East Pakistan. Similarly if Kashmir had been predominantly Hindu-populated there is little question that that state's hilly isolation would also have assumed sufficient geographic importance to set it apart from West Pakistan.

2. Had Pakistan joined India in such a public declaration most of the ensuing difficulties might well have been avoided as the way would have been open for direct Dominion negotiation on the principles of affiliation or for the joint supervision of plebiscites in doubtful cases.

formal recognition of state sovereignty and the decision of the prince, India, banking on the support of the popular movements in the states, has officially committed itself to the principle that popular political loyalty be the deciding factor and that disputed cases be settled by plebiscite. Arguing from Pakistan's own claim that Muslims differed so substantially from Hindus that Muslim-majority areas must form a separate state, Indian spokesmen have assumed that all areas would stay with India unless occupied by Muslim majorities who evidenced a clear desire to join Pakistan.[1]

IV. Hyderabad's Intransigence

Of the 500-odd states in India's sphere Hyderabad is the only one of any importance that has refused to accede to the Dominion. The state is the largest and one of the most autocratically ruled in India. Under the Nizam all of the state's own military forces, the most important part of its police force, and virtually all of its political authority has been reserved as a monopoly for his Muslim co-religionists, who comprise less than 15 percent of the population (See Appendix F, Table 1). Prior to British withdrawal much of this local autonomy was nominal. The main departments of the state government operated either under the close scrutiny or under the actual direction of top British and Indian officials of the Central Government,[2] and a large contingent of the Indian Army was kept stationed in the state.

In July 1947, shortly after the announcement of the decision

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1. While India has disputed Pakistan's claims to Kashmir it may be noted that India publicly announced its rejection of the Khan of Kalat's claims to independence, leaving the Khan no alternative but to acquiesce to Pakistan.

2. Most of the details of this control were not publicly disclosed, but it is significant that a British source friendly to Hyderabad reports that the state authorities expressed surprise that London should censure Muslim-monopoly control, pointing out that the state had been virtually run by the British since 1921 and no attempt had been made to modify the Muslim monopoly.

to partition India, the Nizam announced that in order to avoid communal trouble in Hyderabad he had decided not to accede to India or Pakistan but instead to declare the state independent. This argument was generally discounted in both British and Indian circles,[1] and it soon was confidentially reported that the Muslim clique in Hyderabad was attempting to get international recognition for the state,[2] presumably in an effort to perpetuate their oligarchic control. As Hyderabad's officials have publicly recognized[3] that the state's land-locked position in the peninsula of India made close political and economic relations with the surrounding Dominion inevitable, the bid for international recognition was presumably designed to enable the Muslim authorities to control the state's economic development and as a means of forestalling any attempt on India's part to interfere with the governmental structure within Hyderabad.

V. Factors Encouraging Intransigence

Hyderabad authorities have been encouraged in their bid for independence by four factors: (1) the sizable resources and advantageous position of the state; (2) the present Muslim monopoly of force within the state and the relative weakness of the popular movement; (3) the advice and support of certain

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1. In private conversation with British and Americans at the time, Hyderabad officials made no attempt to disguise the fact that the state was simply hoping to make a bid for independence. According to reports by British officials as well as by the Muslim General of the State Army the only immediate threat to communal peace was the then emerging organization of Muslim bands of Razakars who could have been checked had the Nizam wished to do so.
2. Efforts by Hyderabad's Agent General at London to get recognition in diplomatic circles were followed by informal inquiries at the US Embassy in New Delhi on the part of the Hyderabad Agent General to India presumably with a similar end in view. London and Washington reacted similarly by limiting their contacts with Hyderabad to GOI channels.
3. Statements by the Nizam and the Prime Minister in 1947 and 1948 as well as the Standstill Agreement of November 1947.

British Conservative Party members, and (4) Pakistan's position and support.

Hyderabad is largely self-sufficient in food grains, has important cotton and oil seed crops[1] and is a major source of coal for South India. The state is dependent on the surrounding Dominion for important industrial supplies and much of its consumer goods, but in turn commands the main railway lines connecting Madras with both Delhi and Bombay (see map at end of report). In addition, Hyderabad has husbanded large financial resources, including vast holdings of Indian Government securities which has enabled it to exercise financial pressure upon the GOI and to make a substantial loan to the Dominion of Pakistan.[2]

On the military and political side between forty and fifty thousand Muslims in the State's Forces were trained in modern warfare during the recent war and considerable military equipment was turned over to the state at the end of the war.[3] As a supplement to the regular forces Hyderabad's Muslim political party (the Ittehad-ul-Muslimin) developed a semi-military wing (the Razakars)[4] with the object of quashing any attempt at popular revolt and of making exemplary raids to intimidate the Hindu population. The Razakars, though not well armed by Western standards, are sufficiently equipped to deal with the largely

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1. A recent report indicates that the state is substituting peanut oil as a means of conserving supplies of gasoline.
2. Through the Reserve Bank the Dominion of India can detect and control large transfers of Indian currency or securities to Pakistan and has thus far succeeded in blocking Pakistan's attempt to get payment on the Hyderabad loan.
3. In recent weeks certain British adventurers have been engaged in flying additional military supplies to Hyderabad via Pakistan, apparently bought in Europe; the actual amount is not known.
4. The name is taken from a Muslim general who all but lost his life in the attempt to defend the city of Hyderabad at the time of its conquest by the Mogul power under Aurungzeb. The Razakars, drawn from both militant and hoodlum Muslim elements, are pledged to fight the introduction of representative responsible government in the state and to die to preserve the Nizam's dynasty.

disarmed and politically inexperienced Hindu population.[1] Their leaders apparently have gained considerable influence with the Nizam and exercise virtual control over his executive Council.[2]

The Nizam of Hyderabad has profited from the advice and support of a number of influential members of Britain's Conservative Party,[3] who believe that a fairly strong legal case could be developed in favor of the Nizam's claims to sovereign status[4] and that it is in Britain's interest to recognize these claims. They believe that with British recognition and support Hyderabad could be fitted into the imperial defense system. The state would thus be able to resist military pressure from the Dominion of India and would in turn provide military and air bases of great value to British security interests in the Indian Ocean area. This belief apparently rests on the additional assumption that with British support the Muslim minority could retain its present political control of the state for a considerable period.

The main bulwark for the exercise of Hyderabad's sovereign powers, however, is the existence and future cooperation of

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1. The Razakar leader, Kasim Razvi, has also repeatedly threatened that in the event of any move by Indian forces against Hyderabad the Muslims would turn on the Hindus of the state.
2. Reports from informed and responsible British sources friendly to the Nizam.
3. Sir Walter Monckton, a man of outstanding ability and considerable knowledge of Indian affairs, was retained as legal adviser. See also the remarks of Winston Churchill, Sir John Anderson and Richard Butler in the Parliamentary debates on India during 1947 and 1948.
4. These claims rest largely on the theory that under British paramountcy control of the states through the provincial and later through the Central Government of British India was merely a coincidental and not a necessary political function of that Government. This theory, while admitting the economic integration achieved between the states and British India, attempts to ignore the political integration achieved at the center. Accordingly with the lapse of paramountcy it is argued that the states are legally under no political compulsion to negotiate fresh agreements with the successor governments to British India but can assume independent sovereign powers. Hyderabad's attempt to exercise sovereign powers is presumably not adversely affected by the fact that its position did not differ substantially from the rest of the states, all of which have affiliated with either India or Pakistan.

Pakistan. There have been during the past year close, though clandestine, contacts between Hyderabad and Pakistan.[1] From Pakistan's point of view, an independent Hyderabad would not only serve to weaken India but would be an invaluable ally in negotiations with India in economic matters, and perhaps even more importantly in any negotiations for joint defense. Although the Pakistan press vigorously supports Hyderabad's claims the Dominion has largely refrained from specific recognition of Hyderabad sovereignty.[2] There is, of course, the restraining fact that Pakistan's claims to Kashmir, which are currently being defended by Pakistan troops in the state, closely parallel India's interests in Hyderabad. Pakistan is not likely to take any overt action in support of Hyderabad's independence which would embarrass her more vital interests in Kashmir. There is also some evidence to suggest the existence of an undisclosed pre-partition agreement which binds the Dominions not to recognize the independence of states lying outside their respective geographical spheres prior to such recognition from the Dominion concerned.

VI. The Standstill Agreement[3]

In the fall of 1947 a Hyderabad delegation headed by Sir Walter Monckton negotiated a Standstill Agreement with India which though at first challenged by the Razakar group within the government was finally accepted in November. Under the agreement India was to continue to control Hyderabad's defense, foreign affairs

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1. Mir Laik Ali of Hyderabad headed a delegation to the US requesting a large financial loan for Pakistan just prior to his appointment as prime minister to the State. Hyderabad itself made a considerable loan to Pakistan in GOI securities on which India has thus far succeeded in stopping payment. Mutual consultation and cooperation is undoubtedly facilitated by the fact that the Finance Minister and the head of the Reserve Bank in Pakistan served as ministers 'on loan' to Hyderabad from the GOI prior to partition.
2. Hyderabad's Agent General in Karachi appears to operate independently of the Indian High Commissioner's Office and to be accorded rather full diplomatic courtesy in his own right.
3. See Appendix D.

and communications for one year but without prejudicing the disputed question of ultimate sovereignty. India also agreed not to station troops in Hyderabad except in time of war and arranged to withdraw its troops from the state not later than March 1948. In collateral correspondence both governments agreed to cooperate in discouraging subversive activities directed against each other and in improving facilities for trade and communications. Furthermore, Hyderabad confidentially informed India that it did not intend to accede to Pakistan.[1]

India viewed the agreement as an interim arrangement during which the state and the Razakars were given the opportunity of reorienting themselves preparatory to negotiating terms for permanent affiliation. The Hyderabad authorities, however, apparently regarded the agreement as a temporary success in avoiding affiliation and an opportunity to strengthen the state in its struggle for independence.[2] A contest was inevitable and each side soon began to charge the other with breaches of the agreement.

At the time that the Standstill Agreement was concluded Hyderabad had made a loan to Pakistan of which it did not inform India. It subsequently declared Indian currency unacceptable in commercial transactions in the state, made arrangements to buy and smuggle in arms from the outside, stopped coal shipments to areas of southern India, and independently sent personal representatives to Muslim states in the Near East and a formal appeal to London in an effort to get its claims presented before

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1. It is to be noted, however, that in April 1948 Sir Walter indicated that Hyderabad still considered accession to Pakistan as a possible last resort.
2. This was the confidential estimate of the situation by the British Foreign Office who undoubtedly had held direct conversations with Sir Walter on his return to London.

the UN. Meanwhile the Razakars continued to intimidate the local population, to violate Dominion territory and property, (see map for small Madras and Bombay enclaves), to criticize the Indian Government, and to denounce any Indian attempt to get accession.

After making several conciliatory gestures,[1] India countered by refusing to send military supplies to the state and by prohibiting both the export of currency or precious metals to Hyderabad and the transfer of GOI securities owned by Hyderabad nationals. New Delhi authorities steadily increased their economic pressure on the state to the point of virtually cutting off military and consumer goods from abroad and also a number of important industrial supplies (especially gasoline and chlorine). Passenger and mail traffic was rerouted to avoid Hyderabad as far as possible. Meanwhile the Indian press denounced the Nizam's autocracy and Razakar militancy and urged non-Muslims not to leave the State. Local police forces assigned to protect the border engaged in occasional armed encounters with the Razakars, while some provincial groups attempted to organize raids into Hyderabad.

VII. Monckton-Mountbatten Negotiations

In April 1948 Sir Walter Monckton[2] attempted to resume negotiations with India, indicating to the US Embassy in Delhi that in 1947 Lord Mountbatten had solemnly assured Hyderabad that Delhi would not use any undue pressure in getting the state's affiliation. At the same time the British Conservative press ran a number of articles supporting the Nizam's claims to stay

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1. Indian troops were removed from the state by the end of 1947 and local political leaders were influenced to avoid mass action in favor of a peaceful campaign for responsible government under the aegis of the Nizam.

2. Sir Walter returned to Hyderabad despite his resignation of a few months before following the rejection of his negotiations by the Razakars.

independent if he so chose. Meanwhile in Hyderabad the Nizam released a large number of imprisoned State Peoples' Party members (affiliated with the Congress Party), and announced his intention, periodically reiterated since 1939, of introducing some representative government.

Under the initiative of Lord Mountbatten and Sir Walter negotiations for a permanent settlement were begun at the end of May 1948. India presented Hyderabad with three minimum requirements; viz., (1) the arrangement of the substance of accession to India, (2) the grant of responsible government within the state, and (3) the exercise of full plenipotentiary powers by the negotiators. Hyderabad ostensibly accepted these requirements and a complete agreement was negotiated, only to be rejected by Hyderabad when referred back to the Nizam for his signature. The contents of the agreement are particularly significant in that they were deemed acceptable to such a strong British supporter of the Nizam as Sir Walter as well as to Mir Laik Ali who continues to be Prime Minister of Hyderabad.[1]

Under the draft agreement Hyderabad undertook on Indian request to pass legislation similar to India's in virtually all matters bearing on defense, foreign affairs or communications. The state's regular military forces were to cooperate with the Indian Army under the scheme which has been in operation since 1939, while the irregular forces were to be limited to approximately 8,000 men. Other military formations were to be prohibited; the Razakars were to be disbanded within three months. Although the state could maintain trade agents they were to work in closest cooperation with the GOI and Hyderabad was not to have any political

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1. Mir Laik Ali's denunciation of the agreement came only after its rejection by the Nizam.

relations with any country. Coincident with the agreement the Nizam was to announce (1) the holding of a popular plebiscite on the accession issue, (2) the convening of a Constituent Assembly early in 1949 to draft an instrument of responsible government, and (3) the formation of an Interim Government in consultation with the leaders of the major political parties.

VIII. Rejection of the Draft Agreement

The Nizam's last-minute rejection of the Monckton-Mountbatten agreement indicates that the state's leaders were still gambling on the hope of retaining their power and averting ultimate affiliation to India. Hyderabad alleges that it was forced to reject the agreement on the grounds that India was demanding the substance of accession pending the outcome of the plebiscite.[1] As there was little substantial difference between the new agreement and the present Standstill Agreement in the matter of India's control over the state's defense, foreign affairs and communications, the actual difficulty apparently lay either in Hyderabad's disinclination to disband the Razakars or in its objection to the provision for negotiated arrangements covering joint supervision of a plebiscite, the convening of a constituent assembly and an immediate move for the introduction of responsible government. The absence of any substantive disagreement between the two parties suggested to local British observers that some slight modification of the arrangements on responsible government might be sufficient to save the agreement.[2] Hyderabad was reported to be prepared to start fresh negotiations with the Dominion Government but the Nizam's simultaneous reiteration of the state's claims to

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1. The term substance of accession has come to refer to Dominion control over defense, foreign affairs and communications; cf. India's first and second requirements during the Monckton-Mountbatten negotiations; p. 13.

2. The Statesman, (Calcutta) June 12, 1948.

sovereignty lends itself to the conclusion that the authorities contemplated only a fresh attempt to put the relations on an international basis. Nehru, replying for India, pointed out that the two parties had just concluded a long series of negotiations during which India's representatives had been in constant touch with Hyderabad and that an agreement covering all the main points at issue had just been worked out. He declared that under these circumstances any further negotiations would be a sheer waste of time, although India at the time agreed to leave the agreement open for Hyderabad's acceptance.

Following Hyderabad's rejection of the agreement the Nizam announced independent plans for an impartial plebiscite, a constituent assembly based on Muslim-non-Muslim parity and eventual responsible government. The unfamiliarity with representative institutions on the part of the people of the state, coupled with the intimidating activities of the Razakars and the prime minister's recent warning of severe treatment for any "falterers" were barriers to holding an impartial plebiscite. In the past the Muslim minority has been theoretically[1] prepared to concede parity to the 87 percent non-Muslim majority but has resisted any arrangements which might give non-Muslims an effective majority. Under such parity proposals final power has been retained for the Nizam. Furthermore, the Razakars are specifically pledged to oppose any introduction of

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1. Hyderabad was ten years behind the rest of the major Indian states when it made its first concessions to representative institutions at the end of 1946. The Legislative Council, with largely advisory functions, is composed of 132 members, some three-fifths of whom are elected by a franchise limited to 1½ percent of the population, and with the remaining two-fifths appointed by the Nizam. The principle of communal parity, first announced at the time, applies only to the elected seats. Since one-half of the elected seats and virtually all of the appointed seats go to Muslims this group commands a majority in the Legislative Council. Actual governing powers continue to be exercised by the executive departments under the Nizam's Council. Following the Standstill Agreement this Council was reconstituted at the end of 1947. As a further concession to the principle of communal parity the new Council

responsible government. It remains to be seen what concrete shape may be given to the Nizam's plans or whether they will prove to be only propaganda gestures.

IX. The Indian Position

India's determination to resist any attempt to achieve international status for Hyderabad rests on several considerations. The Dominion cannot, in the first place, allow Hyderabad to become the ally of outside powers potentially hostile to India. Equally important is the fact that if Hyderabad is allowed to break away on the basis of its present claims to sovereignty other princes would almost certainly attempt to follow Hyderabad's lead. The strength of the new Dominion is already so seriously taxed that any extensive princely revolt could well result in chaos. Furthermore, apart from the Dominion's legal claims to Hyderabad, India is convinced that it commands the ultimate political allegiance of the people. The population of Hyderabad belongs to some half dozen different regional groupings[1] all of which overflow into the adjoining provinces and states of the Dominion. Virtually all politically conscious non-Muslims in Hyderabad favor introduction of responsible government and accession to India.[2] Finally, and quite apart from any formal agreement on the matter, the security of Hyderabad (no less than that of all other states surrounded by Dominion territory) is in effect provided for by the Dominion Government, and the people accordingly

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included four members to represent the Muslim community and four to represent the non-Muslim (two of whom have recently resigned). As five of the additional six members appointed by the Nizam, ostensibly on a non-communal basis, were in fact Muslim, that community has had a majority of nine in the Nizam's Council of fourteen.

1. See Appendix F, Table 4 on Language distribution.
2. The state recently lifted the ban on the Communist Party, possibly as a bid for support, but there is as yet little evidence of any Communist campaign favoring continuation of the Nizam's authority.

live under the ultimate protection of Delhi.

With India unprepared to concede Hyderabad's status as a nation and convinced of the need to press for a permanent affiliation before the lapse of the Standstill Agreement in November, two alternative courses of action were open: (1) exertion of economic pressure on the state in order to force the Hyderabad officials to resume peaceful negotiations, and (2) the use of military force. Recourse to military action would probably result in the displacement of the Nizam's authority and might entail communal disturbances of a serious character which could easily spread to the rest of India. A popular non-Muslim revolt is virtually ruled out in view of the aggressiveness of the Razakars, the heavy concentration of Muslims in the state's urban centers (see Table 2 of Appendix F) and the weakness of the nascent popular movement.

The Dominion Government decided first to apply economic pressure.

X. India Prepared to Use Force

The steadily growing rumors that Hyderabad intended to present its claims to the UN followed by the interception of an appeal from the Nizam to King George VI,[1] (presumably urging British support and recognition of Hyderabad's claims[2]) apparently convinced most Indians that the Hyderabad authorities had entertained no intention of reaching a settlement during the recent negotiations. Nehru delivered a belligerent speech in Madras in

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1. Many Britishers doubtless resented Delhi's search of Sir Walter Monckton's private secretary and the inspection of a private letter to King George. Under British rule, however, the interception of the correspondence of rulers and of Indian politicians was a regular practice, and the Nizam's letter constituted a clear breach of the agreement under which India exercises full control of Hyderabad's foreign relations.

2. The contents of the letter are not known but it is presumed to have included an outline of the plan for a UN appeal and evidence of individual British support for the Nizam, possibly involving the UK High Commissioner's Office at Delhi.

which he announced that India repudiated the draft agreement.[1] He also warned that in view of the position of Hyderabad as a subordinate political unit India, if necessary, would resort to military action, which might overthrow the Nizam and erase the state as a corporate political entity. The Razakar threats to massacre Hindus, the military demands of the Kashmir campaign, and perhaps a realization of the difficulties involved in operations[2] against Hyderabad may have restrained the Dominion from resorting to military force. Furthermore, during the past year the British Government has used its influence to urge Delhi to follow the path of peaceful negotiations. Recent military preparations in the Dominion,[3] however, indicate that Delhi may resort to force even before the Kashmir issue is decided, if economic pressure alone does not induce a more conciliatory attitude on the part of Hyderabad. Any outside support for the Hyderabad authorities appears likely to strengthen India's conviction of the necessity of relying on its own military strength and of disregarding counsels of peace.

XI. Problem of Reference to the UN

Hyderabad is now reported to be hopeful of submitting its claims before the UN probably under the sponsorship of one of the

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1. Patel told a public gathering that with the rejection of the agreement Hyderabad had lost its opportunity, and would have to accept the same terms as all the other states.

2. Hyderabad is a large state with a hilly terrain difficult of access from the north and west. The state has been husbanding its military resources since the end of the war and has expanded both its military and police forces. (Most of the 3,000 additional police recently recruited were probably drawn from Razakar ranks). The state also has more than enough coal to run its own rail transport.

3. Certain Indian troops have been moved down to the Hyderabad border and preparations are being made to bring in troops from Nepal, on contract to India, to augment the Dominion Army. The British C-in-C of India's Army is also confidentially reported to have warned Hyderabad's general that if the state continued intransigent, India would choose its own time and place of attack.

Arab states. There is some evidence that the Nizam was preparing for such a move even while the negotiations at Delhi were still in progress.

The main contest will center on whether or not the India-Hyderabad dispute is domestic or international in scope. Although certain individual British Conservatives may assist Hyderabad in the presentation of its case, the British Government will probably support India and urge that the two parties reach a negotiated agreement.

Regardless of India's legal case, that the matter is purely a domestic affair, the Dominion would almost certainly object to running the risk of reference to outside arbitration or to an international court. Such a move would afford opportunity for proponents of the theory of the separation of the states to present their case and force India into a defensive position. The question of the legal position of the states was not regarded as important until 1947.[1] Many of the details relating to former methods of political integration between the states and British India have been matters of confidential correspondence not currently available to India because of the destruction of the records of the "Political Department," of the pre-independence Government of India. Indian leaders accordingly feel that they might have difficulty in demonstrating the weaknesses of the "state separation" argument especially in view of Pakistan's theoretical willingness to honor states' sovereignty and the ambiguity of some of the British official statements on the position of the states during the interim period (see Appendix B). India also fears that Pakistan jurists and perhaps a number of

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1. It is significant that this question did not arise in 1946 when the British made the decision to allow paramountcy to lapse.

British jurists as well might come to the defense of Hyderabad[1] and that their arguments might influence outside jurists.

XII. Pakistan's Role

Although Pakistan has a considerable interest in supporting Hyderabad's claims to sovereignty the Dominion is not currently expected to introduce the case before the UN. Both Pakistan and Hyderabad would prefer outside sponsorship of the case primarily to avoid having the matter viewed as part of the India-Pakistan rivalry over states' affiliation. If Pakistan can avoid direct sponsorship of the case it can play a more active part in supporting Hyderabad before the UN by attempting to assume the role of a friendly but generally disinterested third party. While encouraging Hyderabad to obtain international cognizance of its claim to sovereign status, Pakistan will continue to afford moral support and some measure of covert assistance on a local basis. It is probable, however, that it is with Pakistan's approval that Hyderabad has pressed for a legal consideration of its claims and is now attempting to refer the matter to the UN.[2]

XIII. Implications of UN Decision

Any UN decision on the legal claims of a state ruler will inevitably affect the position of all the states. A dismissal of the Hyderabad case on the score that the Standstill Agreement was still in effect would probably result in a decision to raise the case again after the agreement lapsed. Any postponement of the

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1. Sir Walter Monckton is a fair representative of this point of view. He appears prepared to defend Hyderabad's legal claim to sovereignty although the recent negotiations demonstrate that he recognizes the political necessity of continuing the state's subordination to the central government at Delhi.

2. In the case of Junagadh where Pakistan rested its claims on the sovereignty of the state and the ruler's freedom of choice, the Dominion first urged a reference of the case to judicial decision and later submitted the matter to the UN.

issue, however, would afford opportunity for further attempts at conciliation and reorientation. A final hope of avoiding hostilities would appear to depend on convincing the Hyderabad authorities that ultimately the state must actually accept the two requirements which its negotiators tentatively approved during the course of the Monckton-Mountbatten negotiations, viz., (1) the substance of full accession to India, and (2) the introduction of responsible government within Hyderabad. The British Government currently appears to be using its influence to this end.

XIV. Evaluation of British Role

The Mountbatten-Monckton draft agreement constituted a serious British attempt to aid both sides in achieving a mutually satisfactory and honorable settlement. Mr. Attlee's Government, in response to the Nizam's recent plea for British support, has almost certainly drawn Hyderabad's attention to this British attempt and perhaps also recalled assurances made in 1946 that Hyderabad would cooperate in the future development of India and in the progress of the states towards full responsible government. Meanwhile, Mr. Attlee has reminded Dominion of India leaders of their peaceful declarations on August 15, 1947, the day of independence. It seems clear that British influence is now being exerted to convince both sides of the danger of hostilities and of the advisability of accepting the main substance of the rejected agreement. A jointly-supervised plebiscite would automatically solve the affiliation issue while the arrangements for responsible government might be slightly modified as a face-saving gesture to the state. It is also significant that India's British Commander-in-Chief is reported to be assuring Hyderabad's Muslim Army of "an honorable position in the Indian Army" in the future, and that the Nizam has again been in contact with Delhi.[1] Recent

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1. Sir Mirza Ismail, a former Prime Minister of Hyderabad.

reports indicate, however, that an early settlement is not to be expected.

XV. Hyderabad Attitudes

Some of Hyderabad's leading Muslims are apparently inclined to feel that the state should now make a serious effort to reach an agreement with the Dominion. The state's radical Muslim elements, however, have gained considerable strength and self-confidence during the past year, and appear to be working in close cooperation with the Nizam.[1] They tend to overrate their own military strength and are apparently convinced that they can deal with any internal agitation and that the Dominion of India is too weak to take any effective military move against Hyderabad. The resignation of the (pro-Razakar) Prime Minister in protest over the recent secret negotiations with Delhi and his immediate reinstatement indicates that this group is still in the ascendancy. Nevertheless, the fact that Nizam thought it politic at least to appear to negotiate with the Dominion in June and his subsequent contacts with Delhi suggests that he would not refuse a settlement if he became convinced that there was no possibility of any international recognition of his claims or of international intervention in the event that Hyderabad engaged and temporarily succeeded in resisting Indian military forces.

There is some possibility that the Razakars might eventually get out from under the control of the Nizam. The general of his army, however, is not a member of the Razakar clique,[2] and the Nizam has shown considerable skill in exploiting the Razakars

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was sent to Delhi by the Nizam to attempt to get some further concessions in the draft agreement.

1. At the moment the Nizam is apparently supporting and encouraging the Razakars. Sir Mirza reports that no attempt has yet been made to check them.

2. British estimates are that this force is large enough and well enough equipped to deal with the Razakars.

during the past year. It seems more probable that if the Nizam is himself convinced of the necessity of a settlement he will be able to maneuver the Razakars into a position of acceptance.[1] In the event that the Nizam decides in favor of intransigence, however, he is apparently equally capable of posing as a prisoner of the Razakars while encouraging if not actually guiding their activities.

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1. The Razakars registered no protest while the Monckton-Mountbatten negotiations were in progress although these negotiations involved the very concessions which the Razakars are publicly committed to oppose.

Appendix A

BASIS OF HYDERABAD'S CLAIMS AND OF INDIA'S DENIAL OF THESE CLAIMS

A. Basis of Hyderabad's Claims

1. Hyderabad bases its claims to independence, in the first place, on historical grounds. It claims that the state was never conquered by Britain, that original treaty agreements defining relations with the paramount power were voluntarily negotiated as evidenced by the reciprocal advantages afforded, that Hyderabad has traditionally enjoyed a unique status among the Indian states as Britain's "Faithful Ally," and as such, at various times, has formally annexed and receded important territories in settlement of accounts with British India.

2. With reference to Britain's renunciation of paramountcy, Hyderabad cites the comment of Sir Stafford Cripps in 1946 that the states would become "wholly independent", and points out the absence of any statement during the course of the Parliamentary debates on the India Independence Act to the effect that the states were under compulsion to negotiate with one or other of the two Dominions. Hyderabad's spokesmen also add that, as late as July 1947, Lord Mountbatten declared that the states were 'technically and legally independent'.

3. Finally, Hyderabad's apologists point out that the territorial extent and resources of their state, the size of its population, and the degree to which the ruler commands the allegiance and support of even the non-Muslim majority compares favorably with the situation of many independent countries. They point to the recognition of the validity of its claim to sovereign status by prominent Britishers and leaders of Pakistan.

B. Basis of India's Denial of Hyderabad's Claims

1. Indian spokesmen deny Hyderabad's appeal to history by pointing out that the state dates from Shah Jahan's 17th century conquest of the Deccan, that Hyderabad had been virtually a French dependency prior to Britain's displacement of French power in India, that the British defeated the Nizam's French forces and established partial supremacy (1765-1768), that Hyderabad continued to pay tribute to the Marathas until 1807, that the British succeeded to the tribute and full supremacy after defeating the Marathas, and that the tribute was later cancelled in exchange for other considerations. They add that the British always regarded Hyderabad as occupying a completely subordinate status, and on numerous occasions have explicitly refused to recognize agreements with Hyderabad including the territorial transfers as having the status of international treaties or to concede that exercise of British paramountcy was dependent on the consent of the state. Hyderabad military contingents furthermore, operated under exclusive British control and had long since been directly incorporated into the Indian Army.

2. With respect to the 1946 British Constitutional Plan the Dominion of India argues that Britain expressly recognized that its suzerainty over the states had to be surrendered with the granting of independence to British India and arranged for the states to participate in a single Indian Union under which defense,

foreign affairs, and communications would continue to be controlled by the new Central Government. Only the residual problems of integration were undetermined and these were expressly left to mutual negotiation. Indians point out, furthermore, that the States' representation in the Constituent Assembly was apportioned on the basis of population, that Hyderabad was represented on the Princes' Committee which accepted the 1946 Constitutional Plan and that the State in subsequent negotiations with the Committee from British India agreed in principle that half of its representation in the Constituent Assembly would be elected by popular bodies.

3. With regard to the transfer of power to the two Dominions under the 1947 India Independence Act, Indian leaders point out that all the agencies through which the principal functions of paramountcy were discharged by the British were actually transferred to the Dominion Governments, viz., the Army, departments of defense, foreign affairs, commerce, railways, and communications. The several statements by Attlee, Cripps, and Mountbatten assigning technical independence to the states following the lapse of British paramountcy must therefore be interpreted in the total context of their pronouncements and of political realities. The Indians indicate that matters of major policy during the final year prior to Britain's surrender of power were actually settled by the Governor General's Council, composed exclusively of leaders from British India and acting as an interim Central Government, and that this was done in acknowledgement of the persisting character of the century-old integration of the states and British India. These connections continued unbroken even though they had to be redefined in the light of new political circumstances.

4. Proponents of India argue that the partition as such in no wise enhanced the status of the princely states; it only complicated the problem of accession in cases where economic and administrative ties conflicted with communal and political affiliations. As Britain's withdrawal eliminated Central Government obligations to support princely autocracy and thus afforded an opportunity for growth of popular movements within the states, the new situation required that in the matter of Hyderabad's accession attention be paid to the wishes of the population concerned. Jinnah's invitation to those states which wished to do so to remain independent had never been honored in Pakistan's own sphere (as in the cases of Kalat and Kashmir), but had been reserved in practice for application to India's sphere as a means of encouraging individual rulers such as the Nizam to resist accession to India.

5. In reality, Hyderabad's claim to sovereign status, the argument concludes, is motivated by the desire of the Nizam's partisans to preserve autocratic domination by a militant Muslim minority, ready to employ intimidation in order to prevent the rise of popular opposition. Pakistan's concern to maintain the rule of the Muslim oligarchy in Hyderabad as an important political ally is viewed as a direct threat by Indian leaders, who profess concern that the people of Hyderabad be enabled to assimilate to the larger body politic of India.

Appendix B

RELEVANT ACTS DETERMINING POSITION OF PRINCES AND ACCOMPANYING INFORMAL STATEMENTS ON INDEPENDENCE

A. Cabinet Mission Plan of 1946[1]

"Before putting forward our recommendations we turn to deal with the relationship of the Indian states to British India. It is quite clear that with attainment of independence by British India, whether inside or outside the British Commonwealth, the relationship which has hitherto existed between the rulers of the states and the British Crown will no longer be possible. Paramountcy can neither be retained by the British Crown nor transferred to the new government.

"This fact has been fully recognized by those whom we interviewed from the states. They have at the same time assured us that the states are ready and willing to cooperate in the new development of India. The precise form which their cooperation will take must be a matter for negotiation during the building up of the new constitutional structure and it by no means follows that it will be identical for all states.

. . . . . .

"We recommend that the constitution should take the following basic form:

(1) There should be a Union of India embracing both British India and the states which should deal with the following subjects: Foreign affairs, defense and communications, and should have the powers necessary to raise finances required for the above subjects.

(2) The Union should have an Executive and a Legislature constituted from the British India and States representatives....

(3) All subjects other than union subjects and all residuary powers should be vested in the provinces.

(4) The states will retain all subjects and powers other than those ceded to the union.....In forming any assembly to decide a new constitutional structure the first problem is to obtain as broad-based and accurate representation of the whole population as is possible. The most satisfactory method obviously would be by an election based on adult franchise but any attempt to introduce such a step now would lead to wholly unacceptable delay in the formation of the new constitution....

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1. See article entitled "Text of the British Proposals for Setting Up Independence in India" in The New York Times, May 17, 1946. The article gives the text of the White Paper issued in New Delhi by the Viceroy, Viscount Wavell, and the British Cabinet Mission, and read in the House of Commons by Prime Minister Attlee.

It is the intention that states would be given in the final constituent assembly appropriate representation which would not, on the basis of calculation of population adopted for British India, exceed ninety-three; but the method of selection will have to be determined by consultation.....

B. Cabinet Delegation Statement on Paramountcy,[1] 1946

"When the free and self-governing or independent Indian government is come into being, Britain will not be (in a position)[2] to force this government to carry out the obligations of paramountcy. British troops will not be retained in India to force this obligation on the future Indian government or governments. This means that the political arrangements between the states and the British Crown would (sic) lapse and all rights surrendered by the states to the paramount power will return to them. This void will have to be filled with new engagements between the states and the future government or governments of India."

C. Statement of Sir Stafford Cripps on State's Independence Under Cabinet Mission Plan, (May 1946)

Now a word about the States. The Statement in paragraph 14 makes the position quite clear that paramountcy cannot be continued after the new constitution comes into operation, nor can it be handed over to anyone else. It isn't necessary for me to state - I am sure - that a contract or arrangement of this kind cannot be handed over to a third party without the consent of the States. They will therefore become wholly independent but they have expressed their wish to negotiate their way into the Union and that is a matter we leave to negotiation between the States and the British Indian parties."

D. Indian Independence Act (July 1947)

"Consequences of the Setting up of the New Dominions" (Title of Section 7).

(1) As from the appointed day -

(a) His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have no responsibility as respects the government of any of the territories which, immediately before that day, were included in British India;

(b) the suzerainty of His Majesty over the Indian States lapses, and with it, all treaties and agreements in force at the date of the passing of this Act between His Majesty and the rulers of Indian States, all functions exercisable by His Majesty at that date with respect to Indian States, all obligations of His Majesty existing at that date towards Indian States or the rulers thereof, and all powers, rights, authority or jurisdiction exercisable by His Majesty at that date in or in relation to Indian States by treaty, grant, usage, sufferance or otherwise; or

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1. FBIS, May 23, 1946, Far Eastern Section, Southeast Asia, India, pp. E1-E2.
2. Gap in reception.

(c) there lapse also any treaties or agreements in force at the date of the passing of this Act between His Majesty and any persons having authority in the tribal areas, any obligations of His Majesty existing at that date to any such persons or with respect to the tribal areas, and all powers, rights, authority or jurisdiction exercisable at that date by His Majesty in or in relation to the tribal areas by treaty, grant, usage sufferance or otherwise;

Provided that, notwithstanding anything in paragraph (b) or paragraph (c) of this subsection, effect shall, as nearly as may be continue to be given to the provisions of any such agreement as is therein referred to which relate to customs, transit and communications, posts and telegraphs, or other like matters, until the provisions in question are denounced by the Ruler of the Indian State or person having authority in the tribal areas on the one hand, or by the Dominion or Province or other part thereof concerned on the other hand, or are superseded by subsequent agreements."

E. Statement by Prime Minister Attlee during debate on the 1947 Act[1]

"With the ending of the treaties and agreements, the States regain their independence. But they are part of geographical India, and their rulers and peoples are imbued with a patriotism no less great than that of their fellow Indians in British India. It would, I think, be unfortunate if, owing to the formal severance of their paramountcy relations with the Crown, they were to become islands cut off from the rest of India..... It is the hope of His Majesty's Government that all States will, in due course, find their appropriate place within one or other of the new Dominions within the British Commonwealth, but until the constitutions of the Dominions have been framed in such a way as to include the States as willing partners, there must necessarily be a less organic form of relationship between them, and there must be a period before a comprehensive system can be worked out....

The transition of the States from the lapse of paramountcy into a free association with the new Dominions is a process which will require proper discussion and deliberation.

We welcome the active steps being taken to set up States Departments of the new Dominions to handle negotiations with the State Governments. We trust that this will facilitate the negotiation of the arrangements to which I have referred. If I were asked what would be the attitude of His Majesty's Government to any State which has decided to cut adrift from its neighbours and assert its independence, I would say to the ruler of that State, "Take your time and think again. I hope that no irrevocable decision to stay out will be taken prematurely."

F. Viceroy's Speech to the Princes on Accession[2]

"I would like to begin by giving you a very brief history of the negotiations I have conducted since I have been out here

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1. Hansard, July 10, 1947, HOUSE OF COMMONS, - Indian Independence Bill - 2nd Reading.
2. Taken from an article entitled "Viceroy Addresses Princes and States Ministers," The Statesman, July 26, 1947.

and the line that I have taken up about the States.

"There were two distinct problems that faced me. The first was how to transfer power to British India and the second, how to fit the Indian States into the picture in a manner which would be fair and just to all concerned."...,

The Viceroy reminded the princes that the Cabinet Mission Plan proposed that "the States should surrender to the Central Government three subjects—Defence, External Affairs and Communications.

"That was a plan which, to the best of my belief, every Ruler and every State accepted as reasonable, fair and just."

. . . . . .

"Now, the Indian Independence Act releases the States from all their obligations to the Crown. The States have complete freedom—technically and legally they are independent.

"Presently I will discuss the degree of independence which we ourselves feel is best in the interests of your own States. But there has grown up during the period of British administration, owing to the fact that the Crown Representative and the Viceroy are one and the same person, a system of coordinated administration on all matters of common concern which meant that the sub-continent of India acted as an economic entity. That link is now to be broken. If nothing can be put in its place, only chaos can result, and that chaos, I submit, will hurt the States first—the bigger the State the less the hurt and the longer it will take to feel it—but even the biggest of the States will feel herself hurt just the same as any small State.

"The first step was to set up some machinery by which it was possible to put the two future Governments of India—the Dominions of India and Pakistan—into direct touch with the States."...,

"It was necessary to set up two States Departments, one in each Government because the States are theoretically free to link their future with whichever Dominion they may care. But when I say that they are at liberty to link up with either of the Dominions, may I point out that there are certain geographical compulsions which cannot be evaded.

"Out of something like 565 States, the vast majority are irretrievably linked geographically with the Dominion of India. The problem, therefore, is of far greater magnitude with the Dominion of India than it is with Pakistan.

"In the case of Pakistan the States, although important, are not so numerous, and Mr. Jinnah, the future Governor-General of Pakistan, is prepared to negotiate the case of each State separately and individually.

"But in the case of India where the overwhelming majority of the States are involved, clearly separate negotiation with each State is out of the question.

"The first step that I took was to suggest that in the Bill before Parliament—the Indian Independence Act—a clause should

be put which would enable certain essential agreements to continue until renounced by either side. That was only done to ensure that there should be some continuity and to see if in the short time available it was not possible to get the agreement through with every State representative. It does not replace the need for standstill agreements; it gives a very slight breathing space.

"Now, I think it is no exaggeration to say that most Rulers and Dewans were apprehensive as to what their future would be when Paramountcy lapsed. At one time it appeared that unless they joined the Constituent Assembly and accepted the constitution when it was framed, they would be outside the organization and left in a position which, I submit, if you think it over carefully, no State could view with equanimity—to be left out, having no satisfactory relations or contacts with either Dominion Government.

"You can imagine how relieved I was, and I am sure you will yourselves have been equally relieved, when Sardar Patel, on taking over the States Department, made, if I may say so, a most statesmanlike statement of what he considered were the essentials towards agreement between the States and the Dominion of India....

Discussing the three matters to be handled by the Dominions, the Viceroy said: "I talked with many Rulers and every one felt that Defence was a matter that a State could not conduct for itself. I am not talking of internal security but of defence against external agression.

"I submit therefore, that if you do not link up with one or the other of the Dominions, you will be cut off from any source of supplies of up-to-date weapons.

"External Affairs is inextricably linked up with Defence. External Affairs is something again which is outside the boundaries of India in which not even the greatest State can operate effectively."....

"Communications is really a means of maintaining the life-blood of this whole sub-continent.

"I imagine everybody agrees that the country has got to go on....

"Therefore, I am sure you will agree that these three subjects have got to be handled for you for your convenience and advantage by a larger organization."

Appendix C

CHRONOLOGY OF THE EMERGENCE OF HYDERABAD STATE AND ITS SUBORDINATION TO BRITISH GOVERNMENT OF INDIA

1593	First Mogul campaign against five kingdoms of the Deccan: Khandesh, Ahmednagar (included Berar) Golconda, Bijapur and Bidar.
1593 - 1601	Defeat of Khandesh and Ahmednagar. Latter forced to cede Berar and organization of the two Mogul Subahs (provinces) of Khandesh and Berar.
1630 - 1636	Second Mogul campaign under Shahjahan vs. Deccan. Golconda (Kingdom around Hyderabad) submitted 1635. Ahmednagar defeated, divided with Bijapur; end of Nizam Shahi dynasty.
1636 - 1644	Aurungzeb appointed Viceroy of the four Mogul provinces in the Deccan: (1) Khandesh; (2) Berar, to the SE; (3) Telingana, wild region between Berar and Golconda, under petty chiefs paying tribute to Delhi; (4) Daulatabad (capital at Aurangabad) part of Ahmednagar kingdom divided with Bizapur.
1656 - 1657	Third Mogul attack under Aurungzeb on the Deccan. Fall of Bidar. Attacks begun on Golconda and Bijapur interrupted by war of succession to Shahjahan.
1670	Local authorities of the Mogul in the Deccan near Khandesh agreed to pay one-fourth of the government revenue to the Marathas.
1681	Mogul attack on Deccan resumed.
1686	Bijapur annexed. End of Adil Shahi dynasty.
1687	Golconda (kingdom around Hyderabad city) annexed. End of Kutb Shahi dynasty.
1691	Farthest extension of Mogul power but Marathas not defeated.
1692 - 1705	Indecisive war of Mogul with Marathas for supremacy of the Deccan.
1706	The Marathas obtained the right of levying tribute over all southern India. Aurungzeb's retreat to Ahmednagar.
1707	Death of Aurungzeb.
1712	The disintegration of the Mogul administration begins after death of Aurungzeb's successor, Bahadur Shah.
1713	Asaf Jah, one of Aurungzeb's generals, appointed Subedar (governor) of Mogul territories in the Deccan.

1720	Muhammed Shah (one of Bahadur Shah's successors) formally recognized the Maratha's right to 'chauth' (tribute) over all Mogul territories in Deccan.
1722	Asaf Jah appointed Mogul Vizier. Unable to do anything in Delhi confusion and returned to Hyderabad.
1724	Mogul power disintegrates and governors, though continuing to acknowledge Mogul authority, become largely autonomous and begin to establish their own dynasties in their respective provinces. Asaf Jah begins to use Nizam as formal title.
1731	Asaf Jah, after having attempted to resist the Maratha supremacy, comes to terms with it.
1737	Nizam forced to cede Malwa to the Marathas.
1748	Dispute between sons and grandsons of Asaf Jah over accession.
1750	Muzaffar Jang installed under French protection.
1755	Defeat of French at Plassey in Bengal.
1758	English defeated French in northern Circars. Formally ceded by Nizam to Britain in 1765. Actual possession, 1788. Confirmed in treaty of 1823.
1761	Fall of Pondicherry. Major blow to French power. Marathas only obstacle left in way of British supremacy over Deccan.
1768	British attempt to replace French in Hyderabad. Subsidiary Alliance with Nizam. British to provide defense in exchange for territory (Northern Circars) and to maintain troops.
1779	Nizam attempted to escape British supremacy by arranging coalition with Marathas and Mysore vs. Britain.
1780	Guntur ceded to Nizam in exchange for neutrality.
1782	Peace negotiated with Marathas after principal army defeated.
1788	Nizam recedes Guntur to British and acknowledges treaty of 1768 as supreme in exchange for part of Mysore if conquered.
1792	Campaign and defeat of Mysore. British gave Nizam northern territories as promised in 1788 and limited Mysore to mountainous and unproductive territory.

1795	Marathas overwhelm Nizam at Kharda and reduce him to complete vassalage. French party regains paramount position at Nizam's court.
Treaties of 1798 & 1800. During Wellesley administration when Paramountcy Policy established.	Final defeat of French. British disarm French trained forces of Nizam and force him to accept a revised form of subsidiary alliance and consent to disbandment of his troops under French command. This "reduced the Nizam to complete dependence on the company" - no longer a power to be considered.
1802 - 1818	British get subsidiary alliance from Peshwa - to fight his rivals; final defeat of Maratha power.
1803	Rajas of Nagpur and Berar defeated.
Between 1805 - 1807	Nizam's attempt to subvert alliance quickly quashed.
1818 - 1819	Marathas defeated and British power supreme to Punjab. Subsidiary alliances negotiated with all members of Maratha Confederacy. Peshwa's and Bhonsla's (Nagpur and Berar) territories taken over. British succeed to Maratha right of exacting chauth over Deccan.
1849	Defeat and annexation of the Sikh Punjab, last independent state in subcontinent. All remaining states had acknowledged subsidiary position to East India Company's government in India.
1853	Berar assigned to GOI to provide for maintenance of Hyderabad contingent as Hyderabad's payments had been constant source of trouble.
1858	All governing powers of East India Company taken over directly by the Crown following the Mutiny. British Government of India organized to exercise these powers. Announcement of policy of no further annexation of states in exchange for complete loyalty.
1860	In recognition for cooperation in staying aloof from Mutiny certain territory was assigned to Nizam and sovereignty over Berar formally recognized.
1869 - 1902	Under British pressure, revenue and judicial systems and organization of states administrative departments were brought in line with British India. State began own currency, postal and railway administration under general British supervision.

1902	Nizam assigned Berar to GOI under perpetual lease; became "all but in name, part of British India." Berar was attached to the Central Provinces and the Hyderabad Contingent was merged with the Indian army. "The little province was made over to the Government of India under the fiction of a perpetual lease, so as to preserve the nominal sovereignty of Hyderabad. (Notes to here taken virtually verbatim from Oxford History of India, V. A. Smith, Oxford, 1923.)
1902 - 1947	Theory of separation of states from GOI developed. GOI officials assigned to help manage state's administration. Described as 'on loan' in deference to state's theoretical autonomy. States encouraged to develop small forces, armed by GOI and under ultimate control of GHQ, Indian Army.
1921 - 1923	Transfer of all states from control of provincial governments to control of Central Government. Indian Year Book 1941.
1935	Formal separation of Viceroy's control of states through the Political Department from his administration of British India as Governor General in Council pending the formation of a Federal Government of British and Princely India. In fact Central Government part of Act never launched and Governor General in Council continued to settle major policy matters on an All-India basis. Political Department assured necessary cooperation from the states and exercised general supervision of internal administration. Government of India Act 1935.
1947	New State Department is formed for India and Pakistan to negotiate fresh agreements with states. Old Political Department terminated with Independence Act.

Appendix D

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA AND H.E.H. THE NIZAM[1]

According to the Madras press the following is the text of a so-called Standstill Agreement between the Government of India and H.E.H. the Nizam, signed and made effective on November 29, 1947. It will be noted that the ruler is described as "the Nizam of Hyderabad and Berar" and that his Dominions are described as "Hyderabad territory", and that Article 2 uses the word "Hyderabad" to refer to the city of that name.

"Whereas it is the aim and policy of the Dominion of India and the Nizam of Hyderabad and Berar to work together in close association and amity for the mutual benefit of both, but a final Agreement as to the form and nature of the relationship between them has not yet been reached;

"And whereas it is to the advantage of both parties that existing agreements and administrative arrangements in matters of common concern should, pending such final agreement as aforesaid, be continued;

"Now, therefore, it is hereby agreed as follows:

"ARTICLE 1. Until new Agreements in this behalf are made, all agreements and administrative arrangements as to the matters of common concern, including External Affairs, Defense and Communications, which were existing between the Crown and the Nizam immediately before August 15, 1947, shall in so far as may be appropriate, continue as between the Dominion of India (or any part thereof) and the Nizam.

"Nothing herein contained shall impose any obligation or confer any right on the Dominion.

"(I) To send troops to assist the Nizam in the maintenance of internal order.

"(II) To station troops in Hyderabad territory except in time of war and with the consent of the Nizam which will not be unreasonably withheld, any troops so stationed to be withdrawn from Hyderabad territory within six months of the termination of hostilities.

"ARTICLE 2. The Government of India and the Nizam agree for the better execution of the purposes of this Agreement to appoint Agents in Hyderabad and Delhi respectively, and to give every facility to them for the discharge of their functions.

"ARTICLE 3. (I) Nothing herein contained shall include or introduce Paramountcy functions or create any Paramountcy Relationship.

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1. Taken from R-178, New Delhi, 12-1-47, UNCLASSIFIED.

"(II) Nothing herein contained and nothing done in pursuance hereof shall be deemed to create in favour of either party any right continuing after the date of termination of this Agreement, and nothing herein contained and nothing done in pursuance hereof shall be deemed to derogate from any right which, but for this Agreement, would have been exercisable by either party to it after the date of termination hereof.

"ARTICLE 4. Any dispute arising out of this Agreement or out of agreements or arrangements hereby continued shall be referred to the arbitration of two arbitrators, one appointed by each of the parties, and an umpire appointed by those arbitrators.

"ARTICLE 5. This Agreement shall come into force at once, and shall remain in force for a period of one year.

"In confirmation whereof the Governor-General of India and the Nizam of Hyderabad and Berar have appended their signatures, Mir Osman Ali Khan, Nizam of Hyderabad and Berar; Mountbatten of Burma, Governor-General of India."

Appendix E

THE INDO-HYDERABAD DRAFT AGREEMENT[1]

"The following is the draft agreement which Mir Laik Ali, the Prime Minister of Hyderabad, carried from Delhi for Nizam's approval which was, however, not given by the Nizam:

1. The Nizam's Government agree that they will, on the request of the Government of India, pass legislation similar to the legislation of the Government of India on any matter enumerated in the schedule attached.

2. If the Nizam's Government fails to pass the required legislation with due despatch, the Nizam himself will forthwith pass the necessary ordinance under his own powers.

3. The Dominion Government agree to fix the strength of the Hyderabad Army at a figure not exceeding overall strength of 20,000. The provisions of the Indian State Forces scheme of 1939 will apply 'mutatis mutandis' to these forces and the Government of India undertake to supply arms, ammunition and equipment on the scales and conditions laid down in the scheme. The Government of India will have the right of periodical inspection and the Nizam's Government will also give all facilities in regard to such inspection and furnish such information and returns as they may be requested to do, by the Government of India, from time to time.

4. The Nizam's Government agree to limit their irregular forces to 8,000 in addition to ceremonial household guards. The Hyderabad Government agree that all formations of a military character shall be disbanded. Progressive steps will be taken for the disbandment of Razakars within three months; rallies, parades, demonstrations and speeches by Razakars will cease forthwith.

5. It is agreed that the Government of India will not station their armed forces inside Hyderabad State; but if in an emergency the Government of India wish to station their forces inside the State for the period of the state of emergency declared in India, by the Government of India under Section 102 of the Government of India Act, 1935, this will be agreed to by the Hyderabad Government. In such an event, it is further agreed that the Government of India will be willing to pay to Hyderabad nominal compensation for the occupation of buildings in the State and for other services.

6. If, in any emergency as above, Indian Army Units are stationed in the Hyderabad State they will be subject to the appropriate Dominion Law governing the armed forces of the Dominion.

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1. The Bombay Chronicle, June 18, 1948.

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1. The Bombay Chronicle, June 18, 1948.

7. It is agreed that Hyderabad's External relations with any foreign country shall be conducted by the Government of India. Hyderabad will, however, have freedom to establish trade agencies in order to build up commercial, fiscal and economic relations with other countries; but these agencies will work under the general supervision of, and in the closest co-operation with the Government of India. Hyderabad will not have any political relations with any other country.

8. Subject to the above paragraphs, the existing agreements and administrative arrangements in regard to matters of common concern shall continue and will be given effect to by both sides. The said agreements and arrangements shall not cease to have effect on 29th November, 1948, as was provided in article fifth of the Standstill Agreement on 29th November 1947.

SCHEDULE

A. Defence: 1. Any armed forces raised or maintained by Hyderabad whether within or without the State. 2. Naval, Military and Air Force works. 3. Arms, fire arms; ammunition. 4. Explosives.

B. EXTERNAL AFFAIRS: 1. The implementation of treaties and agreements with other countries; extradition. 2. Admission into, and emigration and expulsion from, Hyderabad, including in relation thereto the regulation of the movements in Hyderabad of persons who are not Hyderabad subjects. 3. Naturalisation.

C. COMMUNICATIONS: 1. Posts and Telegraphs, including telephones, wireless, broadcasting and other like forms of communications. 2. Railways of the Government of India in the State; the regulation of the Nizam's State Railway in respect of safety, maximum and minimum rates and fares, station and service terminal charges, interchange of traffic and the responsibility of railway administrations as carriers of goods and passengers; the regulation of other railways in the State in respect of safety and the responsibility of the administrations of such railways as carriers of goods and passengers. 3. Aircraft and navigation; regulation and organisation of air traffic and aerodromes; provisions for the safety of aircraft; carriage of passengers and goods by air."

"The following is the full text of the draft firman which was to have been issued by the Nizam following his acceptance of the Draft Agreement:

1. After protracted discussions between my Government and the Government of India, I am now in a position to announce the lines of my policy. I am most anxious to put an end to the uncertainties which prevail as to the nature of the relationship between Hyderabad and the Dominion of India.

The views of the Dominion of India have been made clear to me and mine are well-known to them. I have now decided to consult the will of my people upon the question whether Hyderabad should accede to India. I shall, therefore, take a Plebiscite in Hyderabad on the basis of adult franchise. In order to ensure that the Plebiscite is fairly conducted, I shall arrange for it

to be held under the supervision of some impartial and independent body. I shall accept the result of the Plebiscite whatever it may be.

2. But I am satisfied that more is required than the holding of a Plebiscite, in order to restore confidence and tranquility. I have, therefore, decided to instruct my Government to proceed in accordance with the following principles: In doing so they will appreciate that the reestablishment of goodwill between India and Hyderabad is the object of my policy and is of greater importance than the terms of any agreement which may be reached between India and Hyderabad in accordance with these principles.

(I) It is my intention to introduce responsible Government in Hyderabad and to that end to establish a Constituent Assembly early in 1949.

(II) In the meantime, there should be a reconstitution of my Government as a result of which a new Interim Government will be formed, in consultation with the leaders of the major political parties.

(III) My Government has been able to reach agreement with the Government of India on the nature of the Interim relationship between Hyderabad and India pending the holding of the Plebiscite. This agreement which involves some modification of the existing standstill agreement, has been embodied in a separate document signed by my Prime Minister."

Appendix F

SIZE AND INFLUENCE OF MUSLIM POPULATION

Table 1. POPULATION BY RELIGIONS

	1931	1941	Estimate for 1948	Estimate of Communal Percentage for 1948
Hindus	12,176,727	13,310,045	14,238,758	79.4
Muslims	1,534,666	2,097,475	2,650,318	14.6
Christians	151,382	215,980	280,342	1.4
Tribal	544,789[a]	678,149	793,434	4.4
Others	28,584	36,885	44,262	0.2
Total	14,436,148	16,338,534	17,848,214	100.0

a. Animists

Table 2. URBAN CONCENTRATION OF MUSLIMS[a]

Districts	1941 Total Urban	1931 - Urban Population			1931 - Population by Districts		
		Total	Muslims	Percent	Total	Muslim	Percent
Hyderabad	739,159	466,894	192,343	41.2	466,894	192,343	41.2
Atraf i Balda	—	—	—	—	497,661	50,412	10.1
Warangal	1[illegible],697	94,9[illegible]	20,518	21.6	1,117,693	67,820	6.1
Karimnagar	44,462	24,785	5,883	23.7	1,24[illegible],405	55,802	4.5
Adilabad	25,627	12,585	3,175	25.2	762,030	45,821	6.0
Medak	12,865	22,416	4,956	22.1	738,665	71,518	9.7
Nizamabad	52,[illegible]64	18,809	5,046	26.8	623,225	48,769	7.8
Mahbubnagar	32,858	27,325	5,443	19.9	971,616	84,604	8.7
Nalgonda	24,844	10,859	2,554	23.5	1,133,409	62,233	5.5
Aurangabad	89,020	59,278	23,551	39.7	944,793	124,441	13.2
Bir	31,472	25,814	[illegible],[illegible]6	30.4	633,690	53,421	8.4
Nander	36,689	26,992	8,540	31.6	722,081	81,155	11.2
Parbhani	64,193	51,359	16,637	32.4	853,760	88,425	10.4
Gulbarga	118,783	106,895	46,820	43.8	1,225,008	195,586	16.0
Osmanabad	39,399	42,026	12,522	29.8	691,068	80,308	11.6
Raichur	63,658	40,892	9,685	23.7	937,535	95,699	10.2
Bidar	31,752	26,156	13,165	50.3	873,615	136,309	15.6
Total State	1,534,662	1,058,078	378,674	35.8	1[illegible],436,148	1,534,666	10.6

a. Cities of 10,000 or more

Table 3. LITERACY BY RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES - 1931

	Total Literacy			Urdu Literacy			English Literacy		
	Total Number of Literates	Percent of All Literates	Percent of Total Community	Urdu Literates[a]	Percent of Total Urdu Literates	Percent of Community Literates	English Literates	Percent of Total English Literates	Percent of Community Literates
Caste Hindu	391,734	65.8	3.7	78,530	40.9	20.0	39,026	53.6	10.0
Adi Hindu	13,880	2.3	3.2[b]	2,472	1.3[b]	17.8	1,174	1.6	8.5
Muslim	158,859	26.7	12.4[b]	104,980	54.7[b]	66.1	19,275	26.5	12.1
Others	31,160	5.2	20.8	6,057	3.1	19.4	13,371	18.3	42.9
Total	595,633[c]	100.0	5.0	192,039	100.0	32.2	72,846	100.0	12.2

a. Urdu, spoken by most of the Muslims, is the official state language. Less than 14 percent of the people can speak the official language, while only 10½ percent speak it as their mother tongue. About half the population are culturally related to the people of northern Madras, one-fourth to the Marathis of central Bombay and one-tenth to the people of Mysore and southeastern Bombay.

b. Position of Education. In 1936 there were 4,786 public or public-aided schools with an enrollment of 353,171 scholars, of whom 34 percent were Muslims. The schools were divided between those affiliated with Osmania University where Hindustani and English were compulsory and those affiliated with Madras where only English was compulsory. In 1947 the state announced it was terminating the affiliation with Madras, and presumably Hindustani is now compulsory in all the schools. Of the 14 vernacular papers and periodicals published in the state in 1936, 12 were in Urdu and two in Urdu and Marathi combined.

c. The number of literates almost doubled between 1931 and 1941, totalling over 1 million in the latter year. Unfortunately the breakdown according to religious communities is not available.

Table 4. LANGUAGE DISTRIBUTION

	Mother Tongue	Percentage of Total Population	Urdu[a] Speakers	Percentage of Urdu Speakers
Telegu	6,972,534	48.6	181,490	9.3
Marathi	3,786,838	26.4	163,629	8.3
Kanarese	1,620,094	11.3	68,439	3.5
Urdu	1,507,272	10.5	1,507,272	77.0
Tamil	29,050	0.2		
Other	439,454	3.0	37,216	1.9
Total	14,355,242	100.0	1,958,045	100.0

a. Urdu, spoken by most of the Muslims, is the official state language. Less than 14 percent of the people can speak the official language, while only 10½ percent speak it as their mother tongue. About half the population are culturally related to the people of northern Madras, one-fourth to the Marathis of central Bombay and one-tenth to the people of Mysore and southeastern Bombay.

Due to its large size, the following document has been filmed in segments. The order of the segments is as follows: left to right, top to bottom.

HYDERĀBĀD

BOUNDARIES
- International
- State or Province
- District

RAILROADS

	National	Gauge	State
		5′6″	
		3′3⅜″ (meter)	
		2′6″ or 2′	

- STATE OR PROVINCE CAPITAL
- DISTRICT CAPITAL
- OTHER CITY
- THROUGH HIGHWAY

Scale 1:3,260,000

0 25 75 125 Miles

0 25 75 125 Kilometers

M=MADRAS B=BOMBAY DS=DECCAN STATES A=ATRĀF-I-BALDA
M=MEDAK O=OSMĀNĀBĀD G=GUJERAT G=GULBARGA W=WARANGAL

TO BARODA · TO DELHI · TO JUBBULPORE · TO KATNI AND CALCUTTA · TO VIZAGAPATAM

SURAT · NEVSARI (BARODA) · Waghai · GUJERAT STATES AGENCY · DAMÃO (PORT.) · Amalner · Jālgaon · Burāval · Manmād · AURANGĀBĀD · Jālna · JAWHAR · THANA · Kalyān · BOMBAY · AHMADNAGAR · Khopoli · POONA · Dhond · BHOR · JANJIRA D.S. · PHALTAN D.S. · Bārāmati · Sātāra · SHOLĀPUR · AUNDH D.S. · Ellichpur · TO ITARSI · AMRAOTI · AKOLA · Badnera · Murtazāpur · Arvi · NĀGPUR · Kanhan · Tilwari · Pulgaon · WARDHA · Nagbhir · RAIPUR · BERAR AND CENTRAL PROVINCES · Dārwha · Motibagh · YEOTMĀL · Tadali · Pusad · Penganga · Ghugus · CHANDA · Balhārshāh · Hingoli · PARBHANI · Basmath · Mānwath · PARBHANI · Pūrna · NĀNDER · Umri · Nirmal · ĀDILĀBĀD · Godāvari · Pranhita · BĪR · Purli-Vaijnath · Mominābād · BOMBAY · OSMĀNĀBĀD · Lātūr · Udgīr · BĪDAR · Kalyāni · BIDAR · Medak · Siddipet · MEDAK · Kāzipet · WARANGAL · Jagtiyāl · Peddapalli · NIZĀMĀBĀD · Bodhan · KARĪMNAGAR · EASTERN STATES · ORISSA · MADRAS · Yellandu · Bhadrachellam Rd · Dornakal · Khammam · Godāvari · RAJAHMUNDRY · YENAN (FR.) · ELLORE · BEZWĀDA · Bhimovaram · Gudivāda · Narsapur · Narasapur · GUNTŪR · Tenāli · Repalle · MASULIPATAM · BAY OF BENGAL · ARABIAN SEA · KOLHĀPUR · Sāngli · MIRAJ · D.S. · DECCAN STATES · Kistna · Shorāpur · Yādgir · Nārāyanpet · MAHBŪBNAGAR · NALGONDA · Shāhābād · Wādi · GULBARGA · Kosgi · Vikārābād · HYDERĀBĀD · ATRAF-I-BALDA · Sangareddipet · Secunderābād · Bhongir · Ekeli · Aland · AURANGĀBĀD · RAICHŪR · Gadwāl · Tungabhadra · BELGAUM · GÔA (PORT.) · Mormugão · Londa · DHĀRWĀR · Alnāvar · Hubli · Dandeli · Gadag · Kopbal · Hospet · BELLARY · Gunda Road · Gwntakal · Swāmihalli · Kottūru · Dronachellam · MADRAS PT. · Vaigai · Rāyadrug · TO BANGALORE AND MYSORE · TO KATPADI AND BANGALORE · MYSORE · TO MADRAS

HYDERĀBĀD

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U. S. GPO-S